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CHAPTER 15

# Taking an action perspective on infant’s object representations

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**Abstract:** At around 4 months of age, infants predict the reappearance of temporary occluded objects. Younger infants have not demonstrated such an ability, but they still benefit from experience; decreasing their reactive saccade latencies over successive passages from the earliest age tested (7 weeks of age). We argue that prediction is not an all or none process that infants either lack or possess. Instead, the ability to predict the reappearance of an occluded object is dependent on numerous simultaneous factors, including the occlusion duration, the manner in which the object disappears, and the previous experiences with similar events. Furthermore, we claim that infants’ understanding of how occluded objects move is based on prior experiences with similar events. Initially, infants extrapolate occluded object motion, because they have massive experience with such motion. But infants also have the ability to rapidly adjust to novel trajectories that violate their initial expectations. All of these findings support a constructivist view of infants object representations.

## Taking an action perspective on infant’s object representations

As we move around in the environment, objects constantly disappear and reappear from behind one another due to occlusion. Despite this, we as adults manage to maintain a uniform view of the world by compensating for object translations and by representing those objects that are temporarily out of sight. This enables us to predict future events and makes us ready to interact with the environment in a goal directed manner.

Organizing actions towards objects that are temporarily out of view poses specific problems to the perceptual-cognitive system. In order to effectively act towards the future reappearance of a moving object, we must represent that object and be able to estimate both where and when it will reappear. This knowledge is essential for our

ability to smoothly carry out action plans despite the fact that objects go in and out of view. Developing stable object representations signify a major improvement of an infants’ capability to interact with the environment.

The development of children’s understanding of object permanence has been debated with vigour since it was first discussed by Piaget (1954). He considered the development of object permanence to be extremely important. With the establishment of object permanence the child goes from living in a fractionated world with no continuity to a world where objects have permanent existence and unique identity. He claimed that infants do not possess an adult-like ability to represent temporarily occluded objects as permanently existing objects until they understand the sequential displacements of a hidden object at the end of the second year of life. At the same time he noted that

1 infants begin to show signs of object representa- 1  
 3 tion already during the stage of ‘secondary circular 3  
 5 reactions’, that is, between 4 and 8 months of age 5  
 7 but only within the same modality. At this age 7  
 9 infants will briefly look for an object that has dis- 9  
 11 appeared but they will not try to retrieve it. From 11  
 13 around 12 months of age, infants retrieve hidden 13  
 15 objects. If, however, the object is hidden at the 15  
 17 same place several times and then hidden at a 17  
 19 different place, the infants will reach for it at the 19  
 21 previous hiding locations (A not B). It has also 21  
 23 been reported that infants in this situation will 23  
 25 look at the correct hiding place but reach for the 25  
 27 previous one (Mareschal, 2000). Obviously, the 27  
 29 relationship between object representation and ac- 29  
 31 tion is relatively complex.

17 Piaget’s object permanence task is confounded 17  
 19 in one important respect. When the object is hid- 19  
 21 den, the child has to search for it. Failing to do so 21  
 23 might reflect inability to represent the hidden ob- 23  
 25 ject (out of sight — out of mind) but it might also 25  
 27 be caused by inability to formulate an action plan 27  
 29 for retrieving the object, that is, a means-ends 29  
 31 problem. In order to disambiguate the task, later 31  
 33 research has simply presented objects that moves 33  
 35 out of sight behind an occluder and observed how 35  
 37 the child reacts to those events. This can be done 37  
 39 either by measuring their ability to predict where 39  
 41 and when the object will reappear or by measuring 41  
 43 how their looking times change when some aspect 43  
 45 of the events are changed.

33 Most of this work has been focused on how 33  
 35 much infants look at occlusion events in which the 35  
 37 spatiotemporal continuity has been violated in 37  
 39 some way (for related reviews using this method- 39  
 41 ology see Spelke, 1994; Mareschal, 2000; Bail- 41  
 43 lergeon, 2004). This has been done by making the 43  
 45 object reappear at an unexpected location, not re- 45  
 47 appear at all, reappear at an unexpected time, or 47  
 by changing the identity of the object during oc-  
 clusion. Infants looking durations at these various  
 events are coded online (or later from videotapes)  
 by trained observers. The amount of looking is  
 analyzed, whether it declines when the event is  
 presented several times or whether looking is in-  
 creased when something happens that is not pre-  
 dictable from the previous events. If the infants  
 look longer at those stimuli, it is concluded that

1 the discrepancy has violated the infants’ expect- 1  
 3 ancy. For instance, Baillargeon and associates 3  
 5 (Baillargeon et al., 1990; Baillargeon and deVos, 5  
 7 1991; Aguiar and Baillargeon, 1999) habituated 7  
 9 infants to a tall and a short rabbit moving behind a 9  
 solid screen. This screen was then replaced by one  
 with a gap in the top. The tall rabbit should have  
 appeared in the gap but did not. Infants from 2.5  
 month of age looked longer at the tall rabbit event  
 suggesting that they had expected the tall rabbit to  
 appear in the gap.

11 These studies indicate that the infants are some- 11  
 13 how aware of the motion of a temporary occluded 13  
 15 moving object but not exactly how it moves or 15  
 17 when it will reappear. For instance it is not clear 17  
 19 whether the infants expected the tall rabbit to ap- 19  
 21 pear at a specific time or not. The infants might 21  
 23 have looked longer because they perceived the 23  
 25 identity of the object to be changed. Another 25  
 27 problem with this paradigm is that it does not ad- 27  
 29 dress questions related to the micro organization 29  
 of looking; only the duration is recorded. In many  
 experiments only one data point is collected per  
 subject. In addition, because this method does not  
 record how infants’ goal directed responses relate  
 to occurring events, these studies are unable to  
 inform us of the strengths of infants’ knowledge; if  
 these representations are strong enough to guide  
 action.

31 Measuring infants’ actions as they interact with 31  
 33 the environment represent a different approach to 33  
 35 understanding infants’ early perceptual-cognitive 35  
 37 development. In this paradigm infants are required 37  
 39 to organize their actions towards moving objects 39  
 41 that become temporarily occluded. Infant’s behav- 41  
 43 ioural responses are recorded and related to the 43  
 45 spatial-temporal dynamics of the moving object. 45  
 47 With this technique we are able to provide a de- 47  
 tailed description of how infant’s actions relate to  
 events as they occur. This gives us the opportunity  
 to look at how infants’ representations and how  
 their expectations of when and where an occluded  
 object will reappear change over time.

45 This chapter will attempt to review those studies 45  
 47 that have looked at how infants come to organize 47  
 their own actions towards objects that are tempo-  
 rarily occluded. We will both examine when in-  
 fants come to represent occluded objects and

1 attempt to define those variables that limit (or en-  
 3 hance) infants object representations.


### 5 Methodological questions

7 Several different behaviours have been used as indi-  
 9 cators for infants' ability to represent the spa-  
 11 tiotemporal continuity of occluded objects and  
 13 predict their reappearance. Eye movements are of  
 15 primary interest but are tricky to measure. They  
 17 can be coded by human observers from video re-  
 19 cordings but this method is very time consuming  
 21 and crude. More direct, precise, and reliable mea-  
 23 surements of where gaze is directed at each point in  
 25 time are needed. It is possible to measure eye  
 27 movements with electrooculogram (EOG) which  
 29 gives very high resolution in time ( $> 200$  Hz),  
 but as infants rarely move just the eyes, the move-  
 ments of the head need to be measured as well in order  
 to know where gaze is directed. A new generation of  
 eye trackers measure the reflection of infrared light  
 sources on the cornea relative to the centre of the  
 pupil (usually 50 Hz). For some of these eye track-  
 ers, no equipment is applied to the subject who just  
 sits in front of the apparatus. With appropriate  
 calibration, the measurement of cornea reflection  
 provides precise estimates of where gaze is directed  
 in the visual field.

31 Using gaze tracking as an indicator of predictive  
 behaviour when the tracked object is occluded,

1 relies on the following considerations. While the  
 3 object is visible, infants from 2 to 3 months of age  
 5 tracks it at least partially with smooth pursuit (von  
 Hofsten and Rosander, 1997). When the object  
 disappears behind an occluder the eyes are no  
 longer able to sustain its smooth movements (Le-  
 igh and Zee, 1999). Then the observer shifts gaze  
 across the occluder in one or more saccades. An  
 example of such behaviour can be observed in Fig.  
 1. The smooth tracking is visible prior to and fol-  
 lowing the occlusion in Fig. 1B. During the actual  
 occlusion this infant made a saccade from the dis-  
 appearance edge to the reappearance edge. The  
 timing of this saccade (when the saccade was ini-  
 tiated or when it terminates at the reappearance  
 location) provides information of when the infant  
 expected the object to reappear (for the develop-  
 ment of saccade latencies see Gredebäck et al.,  
 2006). The location where the saccade terminates  
 provides information of where the object is ex-  
 pected to reappear. Both of these measures are  
 frequently reported in the following text.

23 The measurements of arm movements is needed  
 for drawing conclusions about infants ability to  
 direct manual actions towards an occluded moving  
 object. In some studies, video has been used but it  
 is also possible to use more automatic motion  
 capture devices where positions are defined by re-  
 flecting markers or light emitting diodes. If the  
 infant reaches for the area where the occluded ob-  
 ject will appear before the object emerges from



33 Fig. 1. (A) An object moving with constant velocity on a circular trajectory that is partly occluded (dark grey areas). (B) Enlargement  
 35 of a single occlusion passage. The circle represent when the saccade is initiated and the square represents the termination of the saccade.  
 37 Only horizontal eye movements are displayed.  
 39  
 41  
 43  
 45  
 47

1 behind the occluder, then infants are said to be  
 3 predictive. That is, the infant has then demon-  
 5 strated an ability to represent the spatiotemporal  
 7 properties of the occluded object and the ability to  
 9 predict how it is going to move in the future. The  
 11 same logic can be applied to infants' head move-  
 ments. Moving ones head to fixate the reappear-  
 ance location ahead of time ensures that the infant  
 fixate the object as it emerges, thereby allowing  
 vision to guide a future reach to the attended ob-  
 ject.

### 13 **At what age do infants start to represent occluded** 15 **objects?**

17 A series of early reports were performed by Nelson  
 19 (1971, 1974) and Meichler and Gratch (1980). In  
 21 these studies 5- and 9-month-old infants were pre-  
 23 sented with a toy train that moved around on a  
 25 track and, at one point, past through a tunnel.  
 27 Infants watched these events and the experimenter  
 29 recorded the infants' eye movements with a stand-  
 ard video camera. In summary, the videos of the  
 infants' looking at this event gave no indication  
 that 5-month-old infants anticipated the reappear-  
 ance of the train from the tunnel. Nine-month olds  
 consistently moved their gaze to the reappearance  
 location at the other end of the tunnel and antic-  
 ipated the emergence of the train there.

31 In recent years the technology available to  
 33 measure infant's eye movements have advanced  
 35 greatly. Numerous studies have taken advantage  
 37 of the high temporal and spatial resolution pro-  
 39 vided by state of the art eye tracking technology.  
 One such early eye tracking study was performed  
 by van der Meer et al. (1994). They investigated  
 4–12 month-old infants' abilities to predicatively  
 track and reach for an occluded toy which moved  
 on a horizontal plane while measuring the infants'  
 eye movements. Infants first started to reach for  
 the toy at 5 months of age. At this age, infants'  
 reaches were reactively launched at the sight of the  
 reappearing toy. However, at the same age, they  
 moved gaze to the reappearance point ahead of  
 time. Not until infants were 8-month-old did they  
 plan the reaching for the object while it was still  
 occluded. This indicates that anticipatory tracking

emerges prior to anticipatory reaching; the former  
 exists from at least 5 months of age.

Recently, Johnson et al. (2003) presented 4-  
 month-old infants with objects that become oc-  
 cluded at the centre of the trajectory. These stimuli  
 were presented on a computer monitor and hori-  
 zontal and vertical eye movements of one eye was  
 recorded using an ASL 504 eye tracker (accuracy  
 0.5 visual degrees, sampling rate 50 Hz). Four-  
 month-old infants who had previously been pre-  
 sented with fully visible trajectories (without the  
 occluder) were more likely to predict the reap-  
 pearance of the object than infants who had not  
 been presented with such learning trials. At 6  
 months of age infants did not demonstrate the  
 same benefits from seeing non-occluded trials. Ac-  
 cording to the authors these results demonstrate  
 that 4-month-old infants do not possess robust  
 object representations but that 6-month olds do.

In an attempt to trace the development of pre-  
 dictive looking in the occlusion situation, Rosand-  
 er and von Hofsten (2004) measured head and eye  
 movements of 7-, 9-, 12-, 17-, and 21-week-old in-  
 fants as they tracked a real object (a happy face)  
 that oscillated on a horizontal trajectory in front  
 of them. Four different conditions were included  
 in this study. The velocity of the object was either  
 constant or sinusoidally modulated. In the former  
 case the object always moved with the same speed  
 and turned abruptly at the endpoints and in the  
 latter case the object accelerated as it moved to-  
 wards the centre of the trajectory and decelerated  
 before each turn in a smooth fashion. In addition,  
 the object became occluded for 0.3 s at the centre  
 of its trajectory or for 0.6 s at one of the trajec-  
 tory end points. Trial duration was 20 s which included  
 five cycles of motion. If the occluder covered the  
 centre of the screen each trial included 10 occlu-  
 sion events and if the occluder covered the end  
 point each trial included 5 occlusion events. In the  
 latter case, the object reappeared on the same side  
 as where it disappeared.

The level of performance in the central occluder  
 condition improved rapidly over age. The young-  
 est infants were purely reactive. It appeared as if  
 the occluder edge itself became the focus of atten-  
 tion after object disappearance. It was found that  
 the gaze of 7- and 9-week-old infants remained at

1 the occluder edge almost 1 s after the object had  
 3 reappeared on the other side of the occluder. Thus,  
 5 in many cases the object had already reversed di-  
 7 rection of motion and was approaching the oc-  
 9 cluder again before the infants re-focused their  
 11 gaze on the object. The relative inability to quickly  
 13 regain tracking had more or less disappeared for  
 15 the 12-week olds. At that age, infants moved gaze  
 17 to the reappearance point as soon as the object  
 19 became visible (that is after  $\sim 0.5$  s). Furthermore,  
 the 12-week olds showed signs of being able to  
 represent the moving object after having seen sev-  
 eral occlusions. The mean gaze lag at reappearance  
 for the last cycle of the trial with the triangular  
 motion was predictive (see Fig. 2). The fact that  
 also the younger infants became more aware of the  
 reappearing object with experience over a trial  
 suggests that they acquired some kind of repre-  
 sentation of the occluded object.

The infants had an increasing tendency with age  
 to extrapolate the occluded motion to the other  
 side of the occluder when it was placed over one of  
 the end points of the trajectory. For the 21-week  
 olds, this tendency was dependent on the motion  
 function used for the oscillation. When the object  
 moved with constant velocity (triangular motion),  
 the subjects made more false gaze shifts to the  
 other side of the occluder. In this condition, there  
 is no way to determine from a single occlusion  
 event whether the object is going to continue or  
 reverse its motion behind the occluder.

To summarize, these studies are all ground-  
 breaking in their own right. The early studies by  
 Nelson (1971, 1974) were the first to measure gaze  
 tracking during occlusion and to demonstrate the  
 importance of learning in occlusion events. The  
 first study to look at eye–hand interaction during  
 occlusion in infancy was provided by van der Meer  
 et al. (1994). At the same time Johnson et al.  
 (2003) and Rosander and von Hofsten (2004) pin-  
 point the immense importance of previous experi-  
 ences. Johnson et al. focused on prior experiences  
 with non-occluded objects whereas Rosander and  
 von Hofsten provided a unique illustration that  
 development does not consist of multiple hier-  
 archal knowledge categories. Instead develop-  
 ment of object representations is a continuous

process that begins as early as 7 weeks-of-age and  
 continuous far beyond 5 months-of-age.



As such, all fail-proof statements about when  
 infants come to represent and predict occluded  
 objects must be regarded with scepticism. Instead  
 the effects of each study that report on the emer-  
 gence of object representations must be seen in the  
 context of prior experiences (both with fully visible  
 and occluded trials). It should be noted, however,  
 is that each of these reports demonstrated a similar  
 onset of object representations at 4 months of age.  
 This is valid even for the study by Johnson et al.  
 (2003); they reported an increase in predictive  
 tracking with prior experience at 4 months of age.  
 This learning appears to be a fundamental com-  
 ponent of object representations and should (quite  
 opposite to the authors interpretation) be inter-  
 preted in support of the notion that 4-month olds  
 have developed such an ability. To date no study  
 has reported on consistent predictive responses at  
 an earlier age.

## Mapping out the psychometric space

### *Trajectory parameters*

Clearly the learning effects described above are not  
 the only component that defines if infants will dis-  
 play mature object representations and have the  
 ability to predict the reappearance location of oc-  
 cluded objects. The ability to represent an oc-  
 cluded object is also dependent on the velocity and  
 amplitude of the moving object and on the dura-  
 tion of the current occlusion event (to name a few  
 contributing factors). The fact that different pa-  
 rameters of the ongoing object motion (independ-  
 ent of previous experiences) is important for  
 infants abilities to predict the reappearance loca-  
 tion of occluded objects is nicely illustrated by two  
 studies performed by Gredebäck and von Hofsten  
 (Gredebäck et al., 2002; Gredebäck and von Ho-  
 fsten, 2004).

In these studies 6–12 month old infants and  
 adults were presented with an object that moved  
 on a circular trajectory and became occluded once  
 every lap. The study by Gredebäck and von Ho-  
 fsten (2004), for example, presented such circular



trajectories to a group of infants that was followed longitudinally from 6 to 12 months of age. In this study the size of the occluder always remained the same (20%) but velocities of the moving object varied ( $2.5\text{--}20^\circ/\text{s}$ ); resulting in four occlusion durations ranging from 500 to 4000 ms. Both studies randomized the presentation order of the different occlusion event and used an ASL 504 eye tracker to measure gaze direction.

The combined experience from these studies is that infants often failed to predict the reappearance of the target (for proportion of successful predictions see Fig. 3), even at 12 months of age (adults performed perfectly). Surely, the between trial randomization lowered the overall performance level and the circular trajectory probably made it more difficult to represent the trajectory of the target. However, the finding illustrated in Fig. 3 is that infants' performance at each age was highly influenced by the velocity (and/or occlusion duration) of the target. The 12-month-old group, for example, ranged in performance from  $<20\%$  to  $>80\%$  predictions dependent on the stimuli used. Unfortunately, these studies cannot disentangle if the occlusion duration or the velocity of the target is the driving factor behind this change (since they co-vary).

However, a recent study by von Hofsten et al. (in press) presented 4-month-old infants with a series of sinusoidal horizontal trajectories (randomized between trials). The design systematically varied occluder width, amplitude of the motion, and velocity of the moving object independently of each other. This was done in order to understand which variables contributed to infants' ability to represent and predict the objects reappearance during occlusion. The results demonstrated that infant's performance could not be explained by occluder edge salience, occluder duration on previous trials, or simply the passage of time. They rather geared their proactive gaze shifts over the occluder to a combination of occluder width,

oscillation frequency, and motion amplitude that resulted in a rather close fit between the latency of the proactive gaze shifts and occlusion duration. Instead of having explicit knowledge of the relationship between these variables, infants could simply maintain a representation of the object motion and its velocity while the object is occluded. The results of von Hofsten et al. (in press) strongly supported this hypothesis. This can be seen in Fig. 4. It is as if the infants tracked an imagined object in their 'minds eye'. If object motion is represented in this way during occlusion, the effects of occluder width, oscillation frequency, as well as motion amplitude can all be explained.

In summary, numerous variables associated with the ongoing occlusion event determine how well an infant will be able to predict the objects reappearance. Even 12-month-old infants often fail to predict the reappearing object if the velocity is high and the trajectory circular. The final study described above (von Hofsten et al, in press) made it abundantly clear that object representations are dependent on numerous simultaneous factors associated with the ongoing occlusion event. These findings clearly demonstrate the importance of mapping out the multidimensional psychometric space that governs object representation and the ability to perform an accurate prediction.

#### *What stimulus information defines occlusion?*

In the study by Gredebäck and von Hofsten (2004), we argued that infant's difficulties with high velocities could not result from an inability to track fast moving objects. Quite the contrary, we found that infants track (gaze and smooth pursuit) similar fast non-occluded motion with higher accuracy (timing and gain) than slower motion (Gredebäck et al., 2005; Grönqvist et al., 2006). Instead we argued that these difficulties can be related to the duration (clarity) of the gradual

Fig. 2. The average time differences and SE between object and gaze reappearance at each cycle of the centrally occluded trials. Separate graphs are shown for the sinusoidal (a) and the triangular motion (b). Each data point is the average of one occluder passage in each direction for all subjects in a specific age group. The upper line corresponds to the minimum time required for adults to program a saccade to an unexpected event (200 ms). Adapted with permission from Rosander and von Hofsten (2004).




Fig. 3. Percentage predictive trials plotted against occlusion size and age in Gredebäck and von Hofsten (2004). Error bars represent standard error. Note that low occlusion durations equal high velocities (500 ms = 20°/s and 4000 ms = 2.5°/s).

disappearance of the object behind the occluder (Gibson and Pick, 2000). In Gredebäck and von Hofsten (2004) the slow moving objects (long occlusion durations) included a slow and clear deletion event. As the velocity of the object increased the duration of the deletion event diminished, making it more and more difficult for the infants to perceive and classify the current events as an occlusion.

To test the hypothesis that infants object representations are influenced by the manner in which the object disappears behind the occluder Gredebäck et al. (in prep.) presented 5- and 7-month-old infants with a ball that moved back and forth along a horizontal path. Gaze were measured with a Tobii eye tracker (accuracy 0.5°, sampling rate 50 Hz). As the object reached the occluder, the ball either became deleted (Fig. 5A) or shrunk (Fig. 5B). It should be noted that the ball reappeared in the same manner as it disappeared in each condition.

The results demonstrate that infants at both 5 and 7 months of age make more predictions in response to the normal deletion condition (~50% predictions at 5 months and ~80% predictions at

7 months) than in response to the shrinking condition (~20% predictions at 5 months and ~50% predictions at 7 months). This suggests that the manner in which the ball became occluded strongly effected infant's representations, in addition to an overall increase in predictive tracking with increased age. Figure 6 include each data point (combined over the two conditions) collected at the two ages. This figure clearly demonstrates that infants track the target and make a saccade over the middle of the occluder.

Another way to manipulate the information pertained in the occlusion event is to turn off the light for the duration of occlusion. With this manipulation it is possible to vary what infants see during the occlusion event at the same time as one maintains both occlusion durations and identical pre- and post-occlusion trajectories. Such studies were performed by von Hofsten et al. (2000) and Jonsson and von Hofsten (2003). Jonsson and von Hofsten (2003) measured 6-month-old infant's head tracking and reaching during occlusion and blackout. During these events a target moved on a straight horizontal path in front of the infants. Either the object was fully visible during the entire






Fig. 4. (a) The relationship between occlusion duration and proactive saccades for individual subjects in Experiment 1 that included occlusion durations of from 0.22 to 0.61 s. (b) The relationship between occlusion duration and proactive saccades for individual subjects in Experiment 2 that included occlusion durations from 0.2 to 1.66 s. The dashed line in both figures shows the hypothetical relationship with saccade latency equal to occlusion duration. Adapted with permission from von Hofsten et al. (in press).




Fig. 5. (A) The deletion condition, (B) the shrinking condition, (C, D) the areas where the ball successively disappear and reappear.




Fig. 6. Colour histograms that include all data points recorded (combined over the two conditions) at each age. Data from each age group is divided in to three pictures dependent on the location of the ball. In between each stimulus infants were presented with an attention-grabbing movie at the centre of the screen. Initial fixations at this location before infants moved their gaze to the ball and started tracking is visible at the centre of the screen when the target is visible to the left.

trajectory or it became invisible during a period just prior to the optimal reaching space. Three different occlusion durations were used in combination with the two modes of non-visibility (occlusion vs. blackout). In both conditions the object

was occluded for 400, 800, or 1200 ms. Infants' head tracking was more inhibited by blackout than by a visible occluder but the opposite effect was observed during reaching. No consistent effects of occlusion duration were observed during blackout.

1 During occlusions, however, the head led at first  
3 target reappearance (predictions) and the size of  
of non-visibility.

5 In summary, these studies add another factor  
7 that limits object representations; namely the stim-  
9 ulus information that defines occlusion. The study  
11 by Gredebäck et al. (in prep.) demonstrates that  
13 providing a clear deletion event allows infants to  
15 classify the stimulus as an occlusion event, and this  
17 will in turn, strengthens infant's representations  
19 and promote predictions. The study by Jonsson  
21 and von Hofsten (2003) demonstrated that the  
23 manner in which an object is obstructed from view  
(occlusion or blackout) also influence the way in  
which infants are able to deal with the object in its  
visual absence. Head tracking is more disrupted by  
competitive visual stimuli (the occluder) and is less  
disrupted by blackout. Clearly infants' actions on  
objects that are temporarily out of view are not  
only influenced by the structure of the stimuli but  
also by the manner in which it disappears from  
view.

#### 25 **How specific are object representations?**

27 Several studies indicate that infants' ability to rep-  
29 resent occluded objects in the context of reaching  
is much inferior to their ability to represent them  
in the context of looking (Spelke and von Hofsten,  
2001; Jonsson and von Hofsten, 2003; Hespos et  
31 al., submitted). Spelke and von Hofsten (2001) and  
33 Jonsson and von Hofsten (2003) found that pre-  
35 dictive reaching for occluded objects were almost  
totally absent in 6-month-old infants. At the same  
time they did not seem to have problems with  
tracking them with their head (von Hofsten et al.,  
2000; Jonsson and von Hofsten, 2003).

41 Hespos et al. (submitted) recorded the predictive  
43 reaching of 6- and 9-month-old infants who  
viewed an object that moved in a straight line  
and, on some trials, was briefly occluded before it  
entered the reaching space. While there was an  
45 increase in the overall number of reaches with in-  
creasing age, there were significantly fewer predic-  
47 tive reaches during the occlusion trials than during  
the visible trials and this pattern showed no age-

1 related change. In a second experiment, Hespos et  
3 al. developed a reaching task for adults modelled  
on the tasks used to assess predictive reaching in  
infants. Like infants, the adults were most accurate  
5 when the target was continuously visible and sig-  
7 nificantly less accurate when the target was briefly  
occluded. These findings suggest that the nature  
and limits to object representations are similar for  
9 infants and adults.

11 Following Shinskey and Munakata (2003) and  
13 Scholl (2001), Spelke and von Hofsten (2001) sug-  
15 gested that young infants represent both visible  
and hidden objects, and their object representa-  
17 tions depend on the same mechanisms as those  
used to represent and attentively track objects in  
adults (Scholl, 2001). More specifically, the object  
19 representations of infants and adults have three  
properties. First, these representations are more  
precise, at all ages, when objects are visible than  
21 when they are hidden. Second, representations of  
different objects are competitive; the more objects  
23 one attends to, the less precise will be one's rep-  
resentation of each object. Third, precise repre-  
25 sentations are required for reaching: to reach for  
an object, one must know where it is, how big it is,  
27 what shape it is, and how it is moving. In contrast,  
less precise representations suffice to determine  
29 that a hidden object exists behind an occluder in a  
scene that one observes but does not manipulate.

31 Spelke and von Hofsten (2001) proposed that  
object representations change over human develop-  
33 ment in just one respect: They become increas-  
ingly precise. Just as infants' sensory and  
35 perceptual capacities become more accurate with  
age (e.g. Kellman and Arterberry, 1998), so does  
37 their capacity to represent objects. While infants  
may reliably predict the reappearance of an oc-  
39 cluded moving object moving on a linear path  
from 4 months of age, the ability to predict where  
and when the moving object will reappear from  
41 behind an occluder is problematic to children be-  
yond their first birthday (Gredebäck and von Ho-  
43 fsten, 2004). Both visible and occluded objects are  
therefore represented with increasing precision as  
45 infants grow.

47 These properties suffice to account for all the  
reviewed findings. Object representations are more  
precise in the dark than in the presence of a visible

occluder, because the occluder competes with the hidden object for attention, decreasing the precision of both object representations. When a young infant participates in a preferential looking experiment involving an occluded object, moreover, she can draw on her imprecise representation of the object to determine that it exists behind the occluder, and in addition identify gross properties of the object such as its approximate location (e.g. Baillargeon and Graber, 1988) and the orientation of its principal axis (Hespos and Rochat, 1997). Nevertheless, a young infant is likely to fail to represent the exact shape, size, or location of an occluded object, because his or her representation is less precise than that of an older child. When a young infant is presented with an occluded object in a reaching experiment, this same imprecise representation is not sufficient to guide object-directed reaching. The differing precision required by many preferential looking experiments vs. many reaching experiments therefore can account for their different outcomes.

### Can infants learn new rules of object motion?

We know that infants can extrapolate linear horizontal trajectories from at least 4 months of age (see the discussion on the emergence of object representations above) and that infant's actual performance on a given trial is dependent on the structure of the perceived events, their previous experiences, and the manner in which the object disappears. We also know that infants from at least 6 months of age can extrapolate circular trajectories (Gredebäck et al., 2002; Gredebäck and von Hofsten, 2004). In these studies (reviewed above) both infants' and adults' predictive saccades terminated along the curvature of the circular trajectory (at the reappearance edge of the occluder).

So, we conclude from these studies that infants extrapolate a number of different naturally occurring trajectories. However, what is still unknown from the above-mentioned studies is whether infants can construct new rules of novel trajectories or if infants are solely governed by pre-existing knowledge of how objects naturally move. This

question, whether the ontogenetic origin of infants object representations emerge from innate knowledge structures (nativism) or if this knowledge emerge in an interaction with the environment (constructivism) have recently been the focus of much research.

The first two studies to address this issue (while relating the infants' predictions to the actual reappearance location of the object) were performed by von Hofsten and Spelke (von Hofsten et al., 2000; Spelke and von Hofsten, 2001). In these studies the authors measure 6-month-old infants' predictive reaching and head tracking during an occlusion task.

In both studies infants were seated in front of a vertical surface on which a toy moved on linear paths. Half of all trials started with the target moving from the upper edges of the screen, moving downwards on a diagonal path (linear trials). During other trials the toy started moving in the same manner but changed direction at the centre of the screen; continuing downwards but reversing the horizontal direction (non-linear trials). At the intersection between these trajectories (the centre of the screen) the toy moved behind an occluder (see Fig. 7). This event prevented the infants from perceiving whether the toy moved on a straight or




Fig. 7. Arrows and letters indicate the four trajectories used (A→D, B→C, A→C, B→D). The white square indicate the approximate location of the occluder while the light grey ellipse represent the optimal reaching space of infants.

1 turning trajectory. To predict the reappearance of  
 3 the object, the infants had to turn their head either  
 5 to the lower right or left side of the occluder (oc-  
 7 clusion durations were 400 and 900 ms). Spelke  
 9 and von Hofsten (2001) contrasted these occlusion  
 11 events with fully visible trials.

7 During the first occlusion event infants did not  
 9 anticipate the reappearance of the toy. However,  
 11 with experience infants rapidly predicted the reap-  
 13 pearance on linear trials (after three trials). Even  
 15 non-linear trials were anticipated, but learning was  
 17 slower. These studies demonstrate that 6-month-  
 19 old infants' are better equipped to learn about  
 21 linear trajectories than they are to learn about  
 23 non-linear trajectories. This finding was inter-  
 25 preted in support of the nativist view; suggesting  
 27 that infants have a pre-existing notion that objects  
 29 naturally move on linear trajectories (e.g. inertia)  
 31 and that infants use this knowledge to extrapolate  
 33 the pre-occlusion trajectory.

21 In retrospect, these papers (von Hofsten et al.,  
 23 2000; Spelke and von Hofsten, 2001) demonstrate  
 25 something different altogether. The studies suggest  
 27 that infants have multiple strategies available to  
 29 solve an occlusion task. Infants can extrapolate the  
 31 pre-occlusion trajectory but they also have the  
 33 ability to learn how to predict novel (non-linear)  
 35 trajectories. As such, these studies do not inform  
 37 us about the ontology of infants object represen-  
 39 tations but illustrate the diversity of recourses  
 41 available to an infant when faced with an occlu-  
 43 sion event.

33 To better understand the nature of these two  
 35 forms of prediction, Kochukhova and Gredebäck  
 37 (in press) presented infants with movies in which a  
 39 ball rolled back and forth between two endpoints.  
 41 The middle of the trajectory was covered by a  
 43 round occluder. Eye movements were measured  
 45 with a Tobii eye tracker. Experiment 1 compared  
 47 infants' ability to extrapolate the current pre-oc-  
 clusion trajectory with their ability to base predic-  
 tions on recent experiences of novel object  
 motions. In the first (linear) condition infants  
 were presented with multiple linear trajectories.  
 These could be extrapolated but infants were un-  
 able to rely on memories of previous events to  
 solve the occlusion task (since each session in-  
 cluded multiple trajectories with different

1 directions of motion). In the second (non-linear)  
 3 condition infants were presented with multiple  
 5 identical trajectories that turned 90° behind the  
 7 occluder. These trajectories could not be extrapo-  
 9 lated but infants were able to rely on previous ex-  
 11 perience to predict where the target would  
 13 reappear.

9 In the linear condition infants performed at as-  
 11 ymptote (~2/3 accurate predictions) from the first  
 13 occlusion passage and performance did not change  
 15 over the session. In the non-linear condition all  
 17 infants initially failed to make accurate prediction.  
 19 Performance, however, reached an asymptote after  
 21 two occlusion passages. This initial experiment  
 23 demonstrates that infants have an initial assump-  
 25 tion that objects will continue along the linear ex-  
 27 tension of the pre-occlusion trajectory. But the  
 29 results also demonstrate that infants can change  
 31 their predictions if another source of information  
 33 is more reliable.

21 In a second experiment the learning effect ob-  
 23 served in response to the non-linear trajectories  
 25 were replicated and extended. Here infants were  
 27 presented with the same set of non-linear trajec-  
 29 tories on three different occasions; a first session as  
 31 soon as they arrive in the lab, a second session  
 33 after a 15 min break, and a third session 24 h later.  
 35 The results can be observed in Fig. 8.

29 First of all, infants quickly learned to predict the  
 31 correct reappearance location of the ball. How-  
 33 ever, after a 15 min break infants had completely  
 35 forgotten where the ball reappeared. Infants re-  
 37 quired a second session to consolidate their expe-  
 39 rience and form a stable memory of where the ball  
 41 would reappear. After this second session infants  
 43 were able to maintain a representation of the tra-  
 45 jectory for at least 24 h.

39 This final study demonstrates that infants' initial  
 41 assumptions are consistent with a linear extension  
 43 of the pre-occlusion trajectory. But, more impor-  
 45 tantly, the study demonstrates that infant can ac-  
 47 quire new knowledge after only a few  
 presentations and have the ability to maintain this  
 information over time. We suggest that these  
 different approaches to solving an occlusion task  
 (extrapolations and memories of previous events)  
 are not governed by separate mechanisms. Instead  
 we interpret these findings in support of the




Fig. 8. Percentage of predictive occlusion passages that appear in the correct reappearance location in each of the three sessions of Experiment 2 of Kochukhova and Gredebäck (in press). Each dot represents the average percent accurate predictions on that occlusion passage. Lines depict the regression line with most explained variance; no significant changes were observed during the second day.

constructivist view, suggesting that both stem from the infants' own experience with the environment. Infants learn to predict non-linear trajectories in the lab but have most likely had enough experience with linear (and curvilinear) trajectories in the real world to help them formulate a valid hypothesis about how objects naturally move. From this perspective the current results appear almost trivial; infants are initially more proficient with extrapolation since this is the only trajectory (of the two presented) that infants have had any real experience with (prior to the study). After a number of presentations of non-linear trajectories infants learn to predict these with equal proficiency.

#### What does prediction really mean?

One noteworthy aspect of measuring anticipatory gaze shifts during occlusions is that predictions occur on only about half of all presented trials in infancy. Despite this, we claim that infants from at least 4 months of age can represent occluded objects. In Rosander and von Hofsten (2004) and in

von Hofsten et al. (in press) the 4-month-old infants moved gaze over the occluder ahead of time in 47% of the trials and in Johnson et al. (2003) in 29–46% depending on condition and age. Similar levels of anticipatory gaze shifts have been observed at 6- (Kochukhova and Gredebäck, in press) and 12-month-old infants (Gredebäck and von Hofsten, 2004). If infants track the spatio-temporal contiguity of the occluded object why do they not make accurate predictions on every trial?

First of all, there is no way to ask infants to pay attention to a specific aspect of the visual scene. As an obvious effect thereof, infants will, on occasion, disrupt tracking and look at some non-task related aspect of their visual scene. If infants shift their attention away from the moving object during occlusion then some of these trials will be undistinguishable from a reactive trial (in which the infant only fixated the moving object after it has reappeared from behind the occluder). It is therefore likely that the above-mentioned studies underestimate infants' performance to some degree.

In addition to voluntary changes in attention, infants' ability to actually represent the occluded object is dependent on the relative salience of each

1 aspects of the visual field. As mentioned above, the  
 2 different elements of the visual field (visible and  
 3 hidden) compete with each other for available re-  
 4 courses. When a moving object is occluded the  
 5 relative saliency of visible stimuli (like the oc-  
 6 cluder) increases. According to this logic, infants  
 7 might have a general ability to represent non-vis-  
 8 ible objects but the actual performance on a given  
 9 trial is easily disrupted.

10 We have described a number of studies that  
 11 demonstrate the diversity of infants' performance  
 12 and the highly variable results obtained through  
 13 small changes in the psychometric space that make  
 14 up the visual scene and the occlusion event. Each  
 15 of these components (e.g. the occluder width, the  
 16 way the object disappears, and the amplitude of  
 17 the trajectory) independently influence the relative  
 18 representational strength of the occluded object  
 19 and its surroundings. Each helps build up and/or  
 20 degrade object representations in a non-linear  
 21 fashion.

### 22 **Myths about eye tracking and occlusion**

23 This chapter has reviewed a number of studies that  
 24 measured infants' abilities to predict the reappear-  
 25 ance of occluded objects. All of these studies rely  
 26 on the assumption that predictions are synony-  
 27 mous with (or at least related to) infants' abilities  
 28 to represent the occluded object and/or its spatio-  
 29 temporal dynamics. There are, however, a few rival  
 30 interpretations of these findings. Interpretations  
 31 that question the link between prediction and  
 32 representations, especially when infant's eye  
 33 movements are used as a dependent measure. The  
 34 following paragraphs will introduce these alternative  
 35 interpretations and address why they are unable to  
 36 account for the obtained results.

#### 37 ***Could predictive gaze shifts be the result of random 38 looking?***

39 Is it possible that infants stop tracking at the oc-  
 40 cluder edge when the object disappears, wait there  
 41 for a while and then shift gaze anyway in a random  
 42 fashion. Some of those spontaneous gaze shifts  
 43 might arrive to the reappearance side of the

44 occluder before the object reappears there. Such  
 45 random tracking would provide a number of false  
 46 predictions. Three of the above-mentioned studies  
 47 clearly demonstrate that this is not the case.

48 The study by Gredebäck and von Hofsten  
 49 (2004) presented infants with four different occlu-  
 50 sion durations. In this study infants scaled their  
 51 proactive gaze shifts over the occluder to the ac-  
 52 tual occlusion duration. More gaze shifts were  
 53 made after 400 ms in response to a 500 ms occlu-  
 54 sion event than in response to a 1000 ms occlusion  
 55 event, and a similar relationship existed for each of  
 56 the four-occlusion durations. If gaze moved at  
 57 random, then the same number of gaze shift would  
 58 end up on the reappearance side of the occluder  
 59 independent of the actual occlusion duration. In a  
 60 similar vein, von Hofsten et al. (in press) demon-  
 61 strated that the proportion of gaze shifts to the  
 62 reappearance edge ahead of time showed no rela-  
 63 tionship with occlusion duration in either of the  
 64 two experiments. Again, the proportion of gaze  
 65 shifts ending up at the reappearance side of the  
 66 occluder would increase with prolonged occlusion  
 67 durations if infants gaze shifts were launched and  
 68 directed at random.

69 A third example comes from the study by Ko-  
 70 chukhova and Gredebäck (in press). In this study,  
 71 the number of gaze shifts during occlusion to each  
 72 side of the occluder was compared. Infants were  
 73 only judged to have the ability to predict the actual  
 74 reappearance location if they made more gaze  
 75 shifts to this location compared to the alternative  
 76 reappearance locations along the occluder edge.  
 77 Their ability to move to the correct location was  
 78 dependent on the trajectory being presented and  
 79 on their previous experience with similar events. If  
 80 infants had moved their gaze at random, then each  
 81 side of the occluder would be fixated to an equal  
 82 degree and none of these effects would be signifi-  
 83 cant.

#### 84 ***Could predictive gaze shifts be the result of occluder 85 salience?***

86 This alternative account suggests that the salience  
 87 of the occluder's reappearance edge determine  
 88 whether infants make predictive saccades across

1 the occluder. If this was the case then stimuli with  
 3 greater visual salience would attract attention to a  
 5 higher degree and result in earlier gaze shifts. As  
 7 contrast sensitivity decreases with increasing ec-  
 9 centricity in the visual field, it is possible that gaze  
 11 shifts in the presence of a wide occluder will have a  
 13 longer latency, not because the subject expects the  
 15 object to reappear later, but because the visual sa-  
 17 lience of the exiting occluder edge is then lower.  
 19 One argument against the visual salience hypoth-  
 21 esis comes from the reactive saccades in the study  
 23 by von Hofsten et al (in press). Reactive saccades  
 25 are by definition elicited by the detection of the  
 27 reappearing object in the periphery of the visual  
 29 field. In this study von Hofsten et al. found that  
 31 the effect of occluder width on reactive saccade  
 33 latency was small (0.45 s for the narrow and 0.54  
 35 for the wide) in comparison to the difference in the  
 37 latency of the proactive saccades (0.33 s for the  
 39 narrow and 0.79 for the wide occluder). It is there-  
 fore unlikely that it is the visual salience of the  
 exiting occluder edge that determines the differ-  
 ence in saccade latency for the different occluder  
 widths. One can, of course, argue that a non-sa-  
 lient stimulus in the periphery of the visual field  
 like the occluder edge will take longer to detect  
 than a salient one like the reappearing object.  
 However, the latency of proactive saccades for the  
 narrow occluder was shorter than the reaction  
 time to the salient reappearing object in the same  
 condition. Finally and most importantly, visual  
 salience could not be the only determinant of the  
 proactive saccades. The effects of oscillation fre-  
 quency and motion amplitude were found to be  
 just as important. Motion amplitude and oscilla-  
 tion frequency refer to variables that are not vis-  
 ually present during occlusion and therefore it is  
 inevitable that information from the seen pre-oc-  
 clusion motion is preserved during occlusion.

#### 41 *Could predictive gaze shifts be the result of* 43 *conditioning?*

45 This alternative account of the studies reviewed  
 47 above suggests that predictive saccades are the re-  
 sult of the simple contingency between disappear-  
 ance and reappearance locations. The hypothesis

is derived from operant conditioning and does not  
 involve any representational abilities. At least  
 three of the above-mentioned studies clearly dem-  
 onstrate that this is not the case. The strongest  
 evidence against this alternative hypothesis comes  
 from the study by Kochukhova and Gredebäck (in  
 press). In the first experiment of this study infants  
 were presented with a numerous linear trajectories  
 with different disappearing and reappearing posi-  
 tion. Each trajectory was randomly selected from a  
 set of linear trajectories leaving no room for con-  
 ditioning of location. Despite this, infants per-  
 formed at asymptote from the very first trial. The  
 fact that infants predicted the linear trajectory the  
 first time they saw the stimuli clearly indicates that  
 conditioning cannot account for infants' predic-  
 tions.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the  
 study by Gredebäck and von Hofsten (2004). In  
 their study infants were presented with four differ-  
 ent (randomized) occlusion durations and that  
 made conditioning of occlusion duration near im-  
 possible.

A third example comes from von Hofsten et al.  
 (in press). They measured whether the previous  
 occlusion duration had an impact of the latency of  
 infants' saccade across the occluder on the current  
 trial. No such factor emerged in the analysis in-  
 stead infants performance was guided by param-  
 eters of the current occlusion event.

#### Summary

The reviewed research demonstrates that infants'  
 actions are directed to the reappearance of oc-  
 cluded objects from a very early age. At around 4  
 months of age, infants overcome the temporary  
 occlusion of an object they track by shifting gaze  
 ahead of time to the position where it reappears.  
 Before this age, infants have not demonstrated an  
 ability to predict the reappearance of occluded  
 objects but they still benefit from experience; de-  
 creasing their reactive saccade latencies over suc-  
 cessive passages from the earliest age tested (7  
 weeks of age). Occlusion is not only problematic to  
 young infants; they appear to challenge even the  
 adult mind.



1 We also demonstrate that prediction is not an all  
 2 or none process that infants either lack or possess.  
 3 Instead each infant's abilities to predict the reap-  
 4 pearance of an occluded object are dependent on  
 5 numerous simultaneous factors. These include pa-  
 6 rameters of the current occlusion event (e.g. oc-  
 7 clusion duration and the manner in which the  
 8 object disappears) and previous experiences with  
 9 similar events (both within the current trial and  
 10 more long-term experience that predate the exper-  
 11 imental session). This illustrate that infant's abil-  
 12 ities to predict the motion of an occluded object is  
 13 determined, in part by their own representational  
 14 abilities, but also by the dynamics of the current  
 15 occlusion event, and the relative representational  
 16 strengths of visible and occluded objects.

17 We have argued that infants' understanding of  
 18 how occluded objects move is based on prior ex-  
 19 periences with similar events. The functioning of  
 20 basic biological processes like those related to the  
 21 perception of object velocity and accretion/dele-  
 22 tion at an occluder edge are necessary for allowing  
 23 the infant to be aware of the object when it is out  
 24 of sight. We propose that these principles are ac-  
 25 quired through an interaction with the environ-  
 26 ment. Infants will initially extrapolate the  
 27 trajectories of occluded objects because they have  
 28 massive experience with linear (and curvilinear)  
 29 trajectories. But infants also have the ability to  
 30 rapidly adjust to novel trajectories that violate  
 31 their initial expectations. All of these findings sup-  
 32 port a constructivist view of infants' object repre-  
 33 sentations.

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**AUTHOR QUERY FORM**

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